The extant literature on fat taxes and thin subsidies tends to focus on the overall eectiveness of such scal instruments in altering diets and improving health. However, little is known about the welfare impacts of scal food policies on society. This paper lls a gap in the literature by assessing the distributional impacts and welfare eects resulting from a tax-subsidy combination on dierent food groups. Using the methods derived from marginal tax reform theory, a formal welfare economics framework is developed allowing the calculation of the distributional characteristics of various food groups and approximate welfare measures of prices changes caused by a tax-subsidy combination. The distributional characteristics reveal that many of the food groups targeted by a fat tax are consumed in greater concentration by low-income households than higher-income households. The overall welfare eect of a fat tax in isolation is found to be negative. While the inclusion of a thin subsidy still results in welfare losses, the negative impact of the fat tax is mostly mitigated by the presence of the thin subsidy. Results suggest there is scope for the design of a scal food policy to combat obesity and poor dietary choice that is both revenue neutral and welfare minimising.
Introduction
One of the most pressing public health challenges today is the prevalence of diet related chronic disease resulting from poor dietary choices, specically overweight and obesity. According to the 2004 Health Survey for England, which records body mass index (BMI), nearly 65% of the adult population were overweight (BMI greater than 25) while almost 25% were obese (BMI greater than 30). A great deal of interest and attention is focused on the use of scal interventions to combat spiralling obesity rates, both in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Much of the work to date on fat taxes and thin subsidies focuses on their overall eectiveness to reduce unhealthy food consumption and reduce obesity rates. While many of the studies conducted by economists tend to show only a slight decrease in fat consumption resulting from a fat tax (Chouinard et (2007) show that up to 3200 deaths from cardiovascular disease could be avoided in the UK through a fat tax on a wide range of foods, and Marshall (2000) demonstrates that a tax on dietary saturated fat could avert up to 1000 deaths a year in the UK.
Despite the attention on the use of fat taxes and thin subsidies as a method of regulating diets and improving health, very little is known about the expected impacts such policies will have on the welfare of the population as a whole. How much redistribution will be achieved by implementing a combination of taxes and subsidies on various food groups? Will the proposed scal interventions harm consumers in terms of social welfare? How much of the welfare change may be attributed to fat taxes, and how much of this damage can be compensated by the use of subsidies? These questions are addressed using the tax reform methodology developed by Feldstein (1972) and Stern (1987) to examine the distributional consequences and welfare implications of fat taxes and thin subsidies on food consumption. From a classical welfare economics perspective, taxing foods will be highly regressive on low income households, especially when the tax is targeted on energy-dense, nutrient-poor, fatty foods which are disproportionately consumed in low income households. However, from a public health perspective, taxing 1 For summaries see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) , Stern and Newbery (1987) , and Santoro (2007) . For applications see Ahmad and Stern (1984) , Newbery (1995) , Ray (1999) , Liberati (2001) , and Kaplanoglou (2004) . unhealthy foods will reduce diet related chronic diseases, increase nutrient intakes, and improve dietary patterns, particularly in the low income households. The extent to which a thin subsidy mitigates these eects is uncertain and largely depends on demand behaviour. Consequently, a fat tax will have a negative welfare eect in terms of regressive wealth redistribution, however such a policy will also have a positive welfare eect in terms of progressive health redistribution. In short, there is a health-wealth trade-o to a scal food policy.
Depending on the responsiveness of consumers to price changes in dierent food groups, a thin subsidy may alleviate (and possibly outweigh) the negative welfare impact of a fat tax. Moreover, the thin subsidy may reinforce the health improvements of a fat tax by increasing consumption of healthier foods. The overall welfare impact and the distributional consequences of a combined scal policy of a fat tax and thin subsidy is the focus of this paper. The distributional consequences are assessed using the distributional characteristic derived by Feldstein (1972) while the welfare impacts are measured using the method presented in Stern (1987) and Newbery (1995) . This paper is organised as follows. A brief review of the literature is in section 2, with an emphasis on the welfare eects of scal food policies. Section 3 describes the theoretical and empirical methodology. The data are described in section 4, as well as the empirical results. The nal section concludes.
Fiscal food policies and social welfare
There is a growing literature investigating the eects of fat taxes and more recently thin subsidies. Much of the research emphasises health outcomes and focuses on the eectiveness of scal food interventions in reducing diet related chronic disease, such as obesity. However, no known study examines the welfare eects of fat taxes (and none in regards to thin subsidies) in a rigorous economic framework. The few studies that in fact address distributional concerns do not do so within a true social welfare context. When considering tax reform and the welfare eect of changes in relative prices, like the proposed changes in food prices from a combination of taxes and subsidies, analysis that follows from a formal social welfare theory framework provides theoretical advantages and also provides limits on the necessary assumptions about the data (Ahmad and Stern 1984) .
First, informal welfare measures of social welfare, such as money-metric measures like equivalent and compensating variation, are far from ideal. Money metric utility measures assume by denition that the social marginal utility of income is equal to one in every household (Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel 1996) . As is discussed in the next section, this is a limiting assumption worth relaxing since it does not allow distributional judgements. Moreover, Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) show that money metric measures violate concavity of social orderings over optimal commodity allocations unless household preferences are homothetic.
2 Thus, while data requirements tend to be modest for money-metric measures, they only represent valid measures of welfare under very strict assumptions which are not normally descriptive of actual behaviour (Blackorby and Donaldson 1988) . Second, considerations of distributional equity can only be assessed under a rigorous social welfare model, which allows the social marginal utility of income to dier between households and permits social judgements on equality. By specifying a social welfare function with heterogeneous marginal utilities, not only can welfare impacts due to price changes be assessed, but distributional implications can be analysed using the distributional characteristic. The distributional characteristic gives a measure of the concentration of consumption in low income households for a set of commodities and allows the analyst to see which price changes resulting from a tax will have a greater impact on poor or rich households (Feldstein 1972) . Hence, the distributional characteristic allows a policy-maker to appropriately target commodity groups for taxes and subsidies and is a powerful tool in applied welfare economics. However, unlike money-metric measures, the distributional characteristic requires a formal social welfare framework with a well-dened social welfare function and so accounts for social preferences.
Leicester and Windmeijer (2004) simulate a fat tax in the UK and assess the distributional eects. In their simulation, food was taxed based on four nutrients found to have adverse health consequences when consumed in large quantities (saturated fat, mono-unsaturated fat, sodium, and cholesterol). The tax was assessed at the rate of one pence per a kilogramme of the nutrient. Based on the simulated tax rate and using data from the 2000 National Food Survey, the fat tax is found to be highly regressive. The poorest 2% of the 8000 household sample spend 0.7% of their income on the tax, while the richest pay only 0.1% (the median income group pay about 0.25%). However, the welfare analysis in Leicester and Windmeijer (2004) is very limiting. First, the calculations do not account for the potentially osetting impact of subsidies. Second, the calculations do not allow for consumers to shift consumption in the event of a price change. Third, the analysis is not based on a formal social welfare framework. Chouinard et. al (2007) examine the welfare eects of a fat tax on various dairy products using a unique micro-data set on weekly average household purchases for a sample of 23 US cities. They simulate the eects of a fat tax based on the fat percentage of dierent dairy products. Based on a 10% tax rate, they calculate the equivalent variation as a measure of the welfare loss resulting from the tax. Their results nd the fat tax to be highly regressive, with the burden falling mostly on the low-income households: the burden is 0.24% for households with an annual income of $20,000 USD, but only 0.024% for households with an annual income of $100,000 USD. While the analysis in While the impact on health from scal food policies is an important area of study, little to nothing is known about the impact on social welfare resulting from a combination of fat taxes and thin subsidies. This paper examines the impact of fat taxes and thin subsides within a formal and rigorous welfare economics framework.
The analysis provides two distinct economic measures of welfare. First, the distributional characteristic is computed providing information on the degree of concentration of dierent food items in low income households and makes clear the extent to which taxes and subsidies will impact the poor. Second, rst-order and second-order welfare measure approximations are calculated to assess the overall impact of fat taxes and thin subsidies on social welfare. The next section derives each of these measures and provides an intuitive interpretation of both the distributional characteristic and welfare approximations in the context of scal food policies. 3 The welfare impact of price changes
The method employed in this paper is based on the theory of marginal tax reform and normative optimal taxation theory. The theory originates with Feldstein (1972) and Ahmad and Stern (1984) and is based on the optimal commodity taxation rules derived by Ramsey (1927) and Samuelson (1986) . Good summaries are found in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) , Newbery and Stern (1987) , and Santoro (2007) . In this method, a set of indirect tax policies are judged based on their distributional impact within a utilitarian social welfare framework. Two aspects of a change in price are being assessed. First, the redistributive eect of the price change is gauged through the calculation of the distributional characteristic for a set of disaggregate goods.
Second, the overall impact of the price change on social welfare is assessed using an approximate measure of welfare.
The starting point is the social welfare function, which aggregates individual welfare levels. Dene the social welfare function over h = 1, . . . , H households 3
where for household h, U h is the direct utility function and is equivalent to the indirect utility function 
where W is social welfare at the changed price and W is social welfare at the original price. The rst step in examining the welfare impact of a price change, such as one resulting from a fat tax or thin subsidy, is to approximate the eect in equation 2. To gauge the distributional consequences of a price change on food expenditure, the distributional characteristic is computed. Attention now turns to the derivation of the distributional characteristic, followed by the derivation of the approximate welfare measure.
3.1
The distributional characteristic Feldstein (1972) introduces the concept of the distributional characteristic of a good as a way of explicitly considering the distributional equity of optimal prices and taxes. By considering not just eciency but also equity, the distributional characteristic represents a value judgement. The distributional characteristic is commonly used to examine distributional consequences from indirect taxes and price changes (See, for 3 Given that household expenditure data is used in the welfare analysis, the relevant unit of measure in this paper is the household rather than the individual agent. See Slesnick (1998, p. 2123 -2125) for a discussion on the justications and limitations of modelling the household as the decision-making unit.
4 Indirect utility is a function of expenditure rather than income in the welfare analysis. Slesnick (1998 Slesnick ( , p. 2146 states that in a static context the appropriate welfare indicator should be a function of total expenditure rather than income, therefore expenditure can be taken as a proxy for income.
example, Newbery (1995) , Ray (1999) , and Liberati (2001) The approach is based on that pioneered by Bergson (1937) and Samuelson (1947) . Before deriving the distributional characteristic, rst consider the impact on social welfare from a change in household expenditure
where α h is the private marginal utility of expenditure (or income). The value of β h is the social weight or the social marginal utility of household h receiving an additional unit of expenditure (Newbery 1995) and it therefore combines the weighting of the policy maker or social planner ∂W ∂V h with that of the private individual, α h . The distributional characteristic is used to measure the extent to which consumption of a particular good is concentrated in those households which are deemed to be socially deserving where socially deserving is recognised by those households with higher values of β h . This is achieved by constructing a measure in which the consumption of the i th good by the h th household q h i with its marginal social utility and aggregating 5 Previous studies tend to use the distributional characteristic in an ex post fashion in which the welfare impact of price changes that have already occurred is being analysed. The use of the distributional characteristic in this paper is ex ante, that is, the welfare impact of price changes that may occur is being analysed. This is similar in spirit to the problem investigated in Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1996) who suppose a hypothetical price change on clothing to assess rst-order and second-order welfare approximations.
6 Feldstein (1972) denes the marginal social utility of income as the derivative of the social welfare function with respect to household income.
across households. Thus, following Newbery (1995) , the distributional characteristic, d i , for the i th good is 7 The measure is unit free, given the normalisation of the individual household social weight (β h ) by the overall average social weight (β), and is bounded between zero and one. In terms of price changes, the distributional characteristic is interpreted as a measure of the relative harm/benet of placing a tax/subsidy on the i th good relative to the harm/benet of placing a tax/subsidy on all households directly (Kaplanoglou 2004 ).
We compute the distributional characteristic for dierent food groups (milk, cheese, pork, fresh fruits and vegetables, tinned fruit and vegetables, etc). This will reveal if consumption of certain food groups are distributed to the socially deserving or not. The higher the value of d i , the more concentrated the consumption of the food group on the more socially deserving households. A typical welfare framework would imply that food groups with a low d i should be taxed while food groups with a high d i should be subsidised. In a social welfare context, any tax on the food group with a relatively high distributional characteristic will be highly regressive if evaluated against income or total expenditure. However, from a public health perspective the implications are dierent. Given the extant literature, high distributional characteristics are likely to be found for energy-dense, nutrient-poor, fatty foods (e.g., pre-packaged ready made meals), which tend to be less expensive than healthier, low calorie, nutrient-rich foods (e.g., fresh fruits and vegetables) per calorie . Consumption of fatty and sugary foods contributes to a range of public health problems, such as diabetes and heart disease, and so the use of scal instruments has been debated as a means of shifting consumption towards healthier choices.
In this paper, the distributional characteristics reveal the extent to which consumption of unhealthy foods (e.g., fats and cheeses) is concentrated in the socially deserving (i.e., low-income households) and the extent to which consumption of healthy foods (e.g., fresh fruits and vegetables) is concentrated in the socially undeserving (i.e., high-income households). If this is the case, then from a public health perspective unhealthy foods should be taxed while healthy foods should be subsidised to improve the distribution of health among low-income households. However, from a social welfare perspective the opposite could be true: unhealthy foods should be subsidised while healthy foods should be taxed. If the distributional characteristics reveal that consumption of unhealthy foods are not concentrated in low-income households, then a fat tax appears more attractive both from an economic welfare perspective and a public health perspective. While obviously 7 The numerator of the distributional characteristic is actually the absolute impact of a price change on social welfare, which is derived in the next section.
still regressive on low-income households, the negative welfare eect of the fat tax may be compensated for by a thin subsidy on healthier food options. The direction of the welfare eect, in terms of income changes, is approximated by the welfare measures derived in the next section.
Welfare approximation
While computation of the distributional characteristics discussed in the previous section is important for summarising the distributional impact of fat taxes and thin subsidies, it does not address the aggregate change in social welfare. Measures that approximate the eect in equation 2, that is the impact on welfare from a change in price, are used to gauge aggregate welfare eects. First-order welfare approximations, which have the notable advantage of not requiring information on consumer demand behaviour, are discussed rst.
Second-order welfare approximations, which extend the rst-order approximation to account for possible shifts in consumption resulting from price changes, are then explained.
First order approximation
As a starting point, suppose the the price of good i increases through a marginal change in the tax rate.
In money terms, household h is worse by the quantity consumed, q h i , or in utility terms is worse o by α h · q h i (Ahmad and Stern 1984) . Using Roy's identity the change in household utility from a price change is given
The change in social utility for a small change in price (e.g., a tax or subsidy on quantities) in equation 2
can be approximated to provide a numerical measure of the change in social welfare. The rst-order welfare approximation of the eect of a small change in price (of good i) is given by
Using equation 5 and social welfare function in equation 1, the level form of the rst-order approximation is obtained
From the rst-order approximation in equation 7, the welfare impact of a price change is seen to depend on two factors: the distribution of consumption, given by the social weights β h , and the level of consumption The approximate welfare change resulting from a marginal change in price of the i th good is found by summing the social marginal utilities of income, β h , weighted by consumption of good i over all households. 8
Alternatively, the rst-order approximation can be written in terms of the distributional characteristic
since the numerator of the distributional characteristic dened in equation 4 is equal to the welfare approximation in equation 7 (Newbery 1995) . The relevance of the distributional characteristic to the welfare eects of price changes is made more clear in the approximation given by equation 8. When a price increase occurs for a good whose consumption is concentrated in households with high marginal utilities of expenditure (i.e., low-income or socially deserving households), the price increase will have a more negative impact than if the price increase occurred on a good whose consumption is concentrated in households with low marginal utilities of expenditure (i.e., high-income households). Given that price changes may occur over the spectrum of goods consumed, the eect on social welfare from multiple price changes is
An expression for the proportional change in social welfare resulting from changes in prices is obtained by normalising equation 9 by the initial level of welfare
Equation 10 measures the proportional impact of price changes on aggregate social welfare and is interpreted 8 Implicitly producer prices are assumed xed so the change in price on good i is equivalent to the tax on that good. While the assumption simplies distributional issues and serves as an appropriate benchmark, tax over-shifting is a possibility (Liberati 2001 ).
as the percent change in welfare caused by a change in price.
Second order approximation
While the rst-order welfare approximation has the advantage of limited data requirements, since only knowledge of expenditure is required, it may also be a biased estimate. The rst-order approximation does not account for changes in consumption in response to price changes, thus it may overestimate the welfare impact of a price increase from a tax or underestimate the welfare impact of a price decrease from a subsidy.
Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1996) provide a second-order approximation of equation 2 using a Taylor
Given that the derivative of the rst order approximation by p i is
The second order approximation in equation 11 can be written as
or equivalently as
where, for each household, h β h is the price elasticity of the welfare weight dened in equation 3, while h ii is the own price elasticity of demand (i.e., the uncompensated Marshallian demand elasticity). The quality of the second-order approximation (and the rst-order) largely depends on the responsiveness of β h and q h to prices (Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel 1996) . Since the additional term in the second-order approximation is negative, the rst-order approximation will generally overstate the social welfare eect of a price change from a tax (or understate the eect from a subsidy). Note that the partial derivatives in equation 13 are evaluated at the original pre-tax/subsidy prices, hence the price elasticities in equation 14 are also based on original prices. Given that the second-order approximation is a function of the price elasticities of demand, estimation of a complete demand system is necessary to obtain the estimated elasticities needed for the computation in equation 13.
Generally, to obtain a more manageable expression, the additional assumption is made that the welfare weights are invariant to prices, implying that h β h is zero.
9 Making this assumption and substituting in the distributional characteristics, the second-order welfare approximation is
where the summation over i indicates multiple price changes. Likewise, a second order expression for the proportional change in welfare resulting from changes in prices is
which shares a similar interpretation as the percent change in welfare caused by a change in price. However, the second order proportional approximation in equation 16 is more accurate than the rst order proportional approximation in equation 10 since it accounts for changes in quantity demand.
Implementation
To make the welfare approach operational, knowledge of two components is required: household expenditure on a set of goods and the ability to determine socially deserving households. Expenditure data is easily obtained from household budget surveys. The social weights, β h , provide the ability to identify households more deserving of marginal increases in income. To calculate the social weights, the social welfare function must rst be given a functional form.
An additive social welfare function based on individual isoelastic utility functions, originally proposed by Atkinson (1970) , is the most frequently used social welfare function in the marginal indirect taxation literature (see, for example, Ahmad and Stern (1984) , Madden (1995a) , Madden (1995b) , Newbery (1995) , and Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1996)) and is formally represented by
Indirect utility is dened over real expenditure (consumption) per equivalent adult, E h , and is parametrised
where ρ ≥ 0 is the coecient of inequality aversion. The social welfare function is more egalitarian with 9 The assumption of price invariant welfare weights is made in nearly all applied welfare analyses, though the restrictiveness of this assumption is discussed in Roberts (1980) , Slivinski (1983) , and Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1996) . See Ray (1999) for an empirical application in which in the welfare weights are taken to be a function of prices. 
where social weight of 1 is being applied to the poorest household (i.e., the household with the smallest expenditure per equivalent adult). Therefore, following Ahmad and Stern (1984) , β h is interpreted as the marginal social value of an additional unit of expenditure to household h relative to the poorest household.
In this case, from the point of view of the social planner, marginal increases in expenditure to the low income households are more valuable than the same increase to a higher income household.
The inequality aversion parameter determines the extent to which a marginal increase in expenditure to the poor is worth more than to the rich. In particular, the social value of a marginal unit of income to the poorest household is worth 11 Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1996) discuss the drawbacks associate with assuming price-independent social weights.
convenient since the coecient of inequality aversion has an intuitive meaning: a one percent decrease in income (or expenditure) implies a ρ percent increase in marginal social utility (Feldstein 1972) . The isoelastic utility function is also convenient in the context of indirect tax reform because assumptions about inequality can be adjusted by means of a single parameter (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995).
12 At one extreme end when ρ = 0 then W = V h is the Benthamian pure utilitarian case of no inequality aversion and β h collapses to unity meaning all households are applied the same social weight so distributional issues are of no concern. In the Benthamian case, the social planner views a unit increase in expenditure to the poorest household to be worth the same as a unit increase to the richest. In the pure utilitarian case, increases and decreases in individual household utility imply a one-for-one change in social utility, and is often referred to The EFS identies four major categories of interest: food (sub-divided in 55 categories), non-alcoholic drink (sub-divided in 7 groups), alcoholic drink (sub-divided in 4 groups) and catering services (split into 3 categories). In addition to data on food expenditure and quantity, other key variables are available, 12 While most welfare studies on indirect taxes and price changes utilise the isoelastic form, other function forms can be used.
Cragg (1991), for example, uses the Kolm-Pollak utility function.
including: ownership of food-related durables (fridges, freezers etc.), housing tenure, key demographics (age, sex, employment status etc.) for each household member, type and composition, social class of head of household, region and categorical degree of activity for head of household (i.e. sedentary, active etc.). While information is collected on eating out expenditure, food eaten out of the home is omitted from the analysis since no data on quantities is provided. The data extracted from the EFS are prepared into a form suitable for welfare calculation.
Individual food items and farm commodities are converted into aggregate food groups that can be identied for a fat tax or thin subsidy. Five main food group aggregations are used in the analysis: dairy, eggs, and fats; meat and sh, cereals and potatoes; fruits and vegetables; and drinks. A sixth category of other foods is used to categorise those component food items that do not clearly t into the other ve categories.
13
Each of the main food groups are composed of component food item groups (25 in total), which are detailed in the rst two columns of Table 1 . While such broad aggregates simplies the analysis, detailed information is inevitably lost in the aggregation process. For example, the milk category includes both full-fat and skimmed milk, and the distributional characteristics may potentially dier between these two sub-category items. Table 1 also presents the sample means and standard deviations of quantities consumed and expenditures for the component food group items. In regards to units, mean quantities consumed per household are in kilogrammes or litre equivalent and expenditure per household is in pounds GBP per kilogramme or litre equivalent. Table 2 presents the sample means and standard deviations of budget shares for both the primary food groups and the component food items. The groups meat and sh and cereals and potatoes on average compose the largest share of household budgets, followed by fruits and vegetables, beverages, and dairy products. However, given the magnitude of the standard deviations, clearly households dier quite widely in terms of which component food groups compose a greater or lesser share of the household food budget.
The fat tax applied to selected food groups is based on saturated fatty acids, while the subsidy is applied to fruit & vegetables. The scal policy used, based on a combination of taxes and subsidies, is designed to be a revenue-neutral scheme. The choice of saturated fatty acids as the prime target of the fat tax is justied by evidence from the medical literature. Saturated fats are an important risk factor in the occurrence of coronary heart disease (Hu et al. 1997 ), higher systolic blood pressure (Esrey et al. 1996) , and higher plasma 13 The exact food group items that compose each of the component food groups is available in an appendix upon request to the author increases the price of each food group by 1% for every percent of saturated fats the group contains. The EFS data set contains nutrient conversion tables that are used to convert food group items into nutrient content.
For example, since milk contains 1.72% of saturated fats, its price increasing by 1.72%. A ceiling of 15% is placed on the simulated price increase. To oset this tax burden, and to encourage the consumption of fruit and vegetables, a subsidy on fruit and vegetables is introduced, so as to exactly cancel the costs of the fat tax paid by consumers. Table 3 presents the tax and subsidy rates applied to the dierent component food group items and assigns an index number to each group. Table 3 also presents the own price (uncompensated) elasticities for each of the component food groups.
14 These elasticities are used in the second order welfare approximation.
Results
Recall from section 3.1 that the distributional characteristic of a good is a measure of the relationship between a household's consumption of a good and the marginal value of a change in household income.
The distributional characteristic is a scale free measure, between zero and one, with values closer to one indicating that consumption of a particular good is concentrated in poor households. Tax receipts will be disproportionately paid by lower-income households the larger the distributional characteristic of a good. A subsidy on a good with a smaller distributional characteristic will be disproportionately paid to higher income households. Subsequently, from an economic welfare viewpoint, goods with larger distributional characteristic ought to be subsidised while goods with a smaller distributional characteristics ought to be taxed. Table   4 Suppose the distributional characteristics under each value of inequality aversion are split into a top half and bottom half, say at the 13 th ranking, for example. Of the fruit and vegetable groups marked for subsidy (fresh, frozen, tinned, prepared, and ready meals), both frozen and tinned fruits and vegetables consistently place in the top half (amongst those groups most concentrated in poor households) whilst fresh, prepared and ready-meal fruit and vegetables consistently place in the bottom half. Moreover, the fats food group (which has the heaviest tax rate) consistently places amongst the food items that are more heavily concentrated in the socially deserving households. Interestingly, the cheeses and creams group, which also has the heaviest tax rate, is consistently found in the bottom half. According to the distributional characteristics in Table   4 , a welfare enhancing policy prescription would be to tax the food items with the lowest distributional characteristics while subsidising the foods with the highest distributional characteristics. However, according to the scal policy scheme implemented with the intention of inducing healthier diets, the foods with the highest distributional characteristics are all targeted for fat taxes. While policy guided by public health concerns may desire higher prices in food groups such as fats and lower prices in fresh fruits and vegetables, a policy guided by economic welfare considerations would suggest a subsidy on fats and a tax fresh fruits and vegetables.
While the distributional characteristics suggest that a fat tax policy will disproportionately burden lowincome households, the welfare approximation in equation 10 is calculated to provide a measure of the overall impact on welfare as a result of the scal policy. Given that there is a possibility that the thin subsidy may oset the negative welfare impacts of the fat tax, the welfare measure yields the percent change in welfare caused by the simulated price change. Table 5 reports the results of computing the rst order approximation in equation 10 and the second order approximation in equation 16 for the scal policy described in Table 3 over dierent values of inequality aversion.
Referring to the rst order approximations, while the percent changes in welfare are small, the overall impact on social welfare from the scal policy is slightly negative. Moreover, the negative changes in welfare are increasing in the level of aversion to inequality, which implies that the scal policy has redistributive eect that is more adverse to low-income households than higher income households. The relatively small impact is not surprising, given that food represents just one of many dierent consumption bundles in the overall basket of goods consumed by households. The second order approximations are very close in magnitude to the rst order approximations, suggesting that the rst order approximation error is quite small. Moreover, the second order approximations are smaller than the rst order counterparts (consistent with theory), but still remain slightly negative. This implies that while the scal policy used in the simulation is revenue neutral, there is a very small decrease in social welfare. To see the extent to which the thin subsidies mitigate the fat tax, the welfare measures are recomputed except with the absence of subsidies on fruit and vegetables.
The results, as presented in Table 3 are revealing. In the absence of the thin subsidy, welfare drops by nearly three percent across all values of inequality aversion. Additionally, the negative welfare impact of a fat tax in the absence of thin subsidy is nearly four times that than when a subsidy is also in place. This welfare impact is viewed as a loss in consumer income or expenditure with respect to the household food budget. As such, a three percent drop is arguably a non-trivial drop in welfare. This outcome is important as it suggests that while a fat tax alone is likely to be regressive and will disproportionately hurt low-income households, thin subsidies remain a useful policy tool that will mitigate the welfare losses that arise from the use of a fat tax in isolation.
Summary
Obesity is of increasing concern throughout the developed world. Some estimates suggest that by 2015, 60% of men and 50% of women will be obese. Being obese increases the risks of a range of chronic health problems including heart disease, type 2 diabetes and high blood pressure. Additionally it has been shown that increased levels of fruit and vegetable consumption will contribute to a reduction in the incidence of some cancers. As a result, there is an increase in interest in public health policies that are designed to reduce the impacts of diet related disease. One such policy is a scal intervention designed to reduce the consumption of calorie and fat dense food and to encourage the consumption of fruit and vegetables. There is a trade-o between health and wealth from imposing a fat tax on society. In terms of public health, taxing unhealthy, fatty foods is likely to have a positive health eect as consumers shift their distribution of consumption to healthier food choices. However, in terms of social welfare, since consumption of fatty and calorie dense foods tends to be concentrated in low income households, a fat tax is likely to extremely regressive. This paper lls a knowledge gap by focusing on the redistribution of income resulting from a tax-subsidy combination on dierent food groups. Further, unlike previous studies, this paper uses a formal welfare economics framework to assess the welfare implications of a combination of fat taxes and thin subsidies.
This paper examines the distributional consequences and economic welfare impacts of such a policy. The study nds that there is a trade-o between public health and economic welfare from imposing a fat tax on society. Energy-dense/nutrient-poor foods are disproportionately consumed among low-income households, which are the foods most likely to be taxed by a fat tax policy. Thus, scal interventions can have adverse welfare implications for the very population it is intended to benet. This paper shows that this is indeed the case, that food is a distribution ally sensitive item in the household budget. Results also indicate that the consumption of food groups marked for taxes tends to be concentrated in the socially deserving households.
The welfare analysis shows that a fat tax applied alone will be regressive and will have a substantially negative impact on welfare. However, a thin subsidy can mitigate the welfare losses to a large extent. Therefore, in terms of a scal food policy designed to combat obesity and promote healthy eating, such a policy ought to include both fat taxes and thin subsidies. 
